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W

ar is special with us constitutional democrats. It repels us in a way that
helps to deﬁne us. Reﬂection on our experience with war also exposes our
view of human nature, the nature of the Constitution and of constitutional
obligation, the nature of constitutional maintenance, and the most fundamental aim of constitutional reform.
Like most animal life, we fear life-threatening physical violence. Yet
with us, unlike with some other members of the kingdom and even the
species, fear of such violence tends to be our greatest fear, or so our philosophic forebears believed. Hobbes invited us to join his reﬂections on the
fear of violent death as epistemic of our true sociopolitical selves. These
reﬂections gave birth to our Lockean or secular bourgeois way of life, our
‘‘constitution’’ in the cultural sense.∞ The legal part of America’s constitution, accordingly, tries to do things that would amaze an ancient Greek or
Roman and that outrage some of today’s true religious believers. The
Constitution subordinates military to civilian authority (implicitly valuing
peace over war and comfort over glory); it forbids establishment of religion
and religious tests for o≈ce (implicitly trusting those who pursue earthly
goods over priests, as such); it lets our governments hang horse thieves
while forbidding any punishment whatever for those who turn our youth
toward false gods and destroy their otherwise immortal souls.
In the same way that Hobbes and Locke presented the social compact as
mere means to peace and security, the Constitution was originally presented
as a means to bourgeois ends: the union of the many, as distinguished
from—better, as opposed to—the distinction of the few; domestic tran-
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quility and the blessings of liberty, as opposed to the honor of disciplined
self-sacriﬁce and the glory of imperial power. Add the amending provisions
of Article V to the ends of the Preamble and view both through the window
to a constitution-making past (and to a constitution-making future?) that
Article VII provides—do these things and you can see the Constitution’s
instrumentalist dimension. Reﬂect further and you can see that this instrumentalist dimension dominates the Constitution’s legal dimension, especially when the chips are down. Hobbes knew no logic that could convert
an instrumental norm to a moral norm—because we consent to save ourselves, we owe nothing to the sovereign who turns on us to destroy us.≤
Je√erson wrote in the Declaration of Independence that a people has the
right to abolish and reconstitute any government ‘‘as to them shall seem
most likely to e√ect their Safety and Happiness.’’ Madison wrote in The
Federalist that ‘‘the real welfare of the great body of the people is the supreme object to be pursued,’’ and ‘‘no form of Government whatever, has
any other value, than as it may be ﬁtted for the attainment of this object.’’≥
For Madison this included more than the articles of confederation and
‘‘perpetual Union’’ to which the states had once consented; it included also
the Union and the plan of the Philadelphia Convention.∂
‘‘[S]upreme object[s],’’ then, as more compelling with us than supreme
laws? Madison cited the people’s welfare to disestablish the old articles of
union. The people’s safety in time of war rationalized the unconstitutional
Sedition Act. In time of civil war Lincoln cited the people’s welfare to justify
overriding constitutional rights, forms, and limits. The people’s safety, as
perceived, trumped the constitutional rights of Japanese-Americans in the
Second World War. Messrs. Bush, Rumsfeld, and Ashcroft cite the people’s
safety in time of war to justify overriding constitutional forms, rights, and
limits today. And, as in candor it would have admitted, the Rehnquist
Court sacriﬁced its own constitutional principles to political and social
order in the election of 2000, an episode of the present Kulturkampf, or
culture war, to which Justice Scalia referred in dissent in Romer v. Evans∑ and
Lawrence v. Texas.∏ Indeed, Bush v. Goreπ has proved to be something of an
augur of what was to come. Mr. Bush, Florida Republicans, and the Rehnquist Court fabricated a constitutional crisis and then the Rehnquist Court
averted the crisis by securing Mr. Bush’s victory. Then war and crisis without end became Mr. Bush’s chief justiﬁcations for overriding constitutional
limits and consolidating a rightward realignment of American politics.∫
233
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These events suggest the following mix of normative and behavioral
propositions:
1. Constitutional forms, rights, and limits tend to obtain only under more
or less ideal conditions, and war (including culture war) isn’t one of them.
2. Constitutional forms, rights, and limits give way (and sometimes
ought to give way) to substantive constitutional ends, unless they can be
conceived as aspects of substantive constitutional ends (free inquiry, reasonable diversity, and broadly representative legislative assemblies as aspects of the pursuit of real rather than merely apparent public goods, for
example, or freedom from religious establishment and free exercise as aspects of the moderate religiosity associated with constitutional democracy).
3. Respect for constitutional forms, rights, and limits entails a substantive policy agenda, an agenda informed by the social conditions under
which honoring forms, rights, and limits makes sense or would make sense
to reasonable actors. These conditions include peace or reasonable prospects for peace, international security, a generally secular reasonableness in
domestic politics, racial and ethnic integration, progress in the arts and
sciences, and a general economic well-being.
4. Because there are di√erent kinds of war; because both the presence
and the imminence of war can be controversial; because what holds for war
can reasonably hold for impending war; because war can be used as an
excuse to achieve ends not otherwise achievable—for these reasons at least,
constitutional forms are no substitute for a population that generally exhibits and respects a more or less common set of virtues and attitudes that
support constitutional forms. To that extent, the Constitution really is not
meant for people with fundamentally di√erent views.
5. The ﬁeld of constitutional theory needs theories of constitutional
ends, conditions, and virtues, together with theories of how to promote the
requisite ends, conditions, and virtues.
In light of these propositions, let us revisit the Supreme Court’s action in
Bush v. Gore. Thayer and Hand warned that courts cannot save a people
from ruin.Ω Many have doubted that courts can avert or resolve constitutional crises. But others have disagreed, contending that courts sometimes
can resolve divisive national controversies.∞≠ Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, derided this idea in 1992 when the subject
was abortion.∞∞ They had a change of heart in Bush v. Gore.
234
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Conservatives generally had a change of heart about judicial statesmanship in the ﬁnal days of election 2000. They looked to the Court to avert or
resolve what they viewed as the constitutional crisis thrown up by the
election controversy. Professor John Yoo proposed that the Court should
take a page from Planned Parenthood v. Casey and resolve the controversy.∞≤
In a similar vein, the columnist William Saﬁre urged that the Court ‘‘did
itself proud’’ and ‘‘saved the Republic’’ from ‘‘much tension.’’∞≥ In this section, we will explore whether conservatives can justify Bush as an act of
judicial statesmanship to spare the nation a constitutional crisis.∞∂
Make no mistake: We think the 5-4 decision in Bush is both unprincipled and bad.∞∑ Nevertheless, we do want to distinguish these attributes—
unprincipled and bad—and to show how Bush might be thought good (or at
least not irredeemably bad) while being unprincipled. We’ll leave it as a
possibility, moreover, without argument here, that being good and unprincipled is better (more good) than being bad and principled. We’ll thus leave
it as a possibility that Bush was a good decision notwithstanding its unprincipled character. This will be small comfort to most of the conservative
scholars who have tried in vain to defend Bush. For they can’t defend Bush as
we’re suggesting without forfeiting their basic view of both the Constitution and the judiciary’s proper role.
Forget any and all attempts to square Bush with the provisions of Article
II, the text, history, and conventional understanding of the equal protection
clause, the familiar normative relationships between legislatures, courts,
and constitutions, and second-order rules like deference to state courts on
matters of state law.∞∏ These attempts won’t work; indeed, some conservatives have admitted they won’t work. Conservatives have tried and failed to
square Bush with the law. Others will follow, and they too will fail, or so we
believe and will assume for purposes of this essay. But if rules and more
general norms like maxims and principles can’t justify Bush, maybe constitutional ends, aspirations, or goods can. Maybe the Bush ﬁve thought that the
Court had to ignore the rules, even its own rules, to spare the country and
the Constitution harm greater than the harm that comes from a decision
exposing both the impotence and the mythical side of ‘‘the rule of law.’’
As we all know, the rule of law is contingent on circumstances that the
law can’t guarantee; Korematsu v. United States∞π demonstrated that. So did
the Great Depression, some say. And so, we add, did the actions of the
founder of the Old Republican Party, as opposed to the Reaganized party of
235
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Mr. Bush and the Bush ﬁve. Lincoln violated the Constitution to save the
Union and the Constitution.∞∫
Violate the Constitution to save it? No paradox once you realize that as
a practical matter at least (and as a theoretical matter too) ﬁdelity to the
Constitution always presupposes material conditions that the Constitution
can’t guarantee. Lincoln felt that he might lose the war unless he displaced
Congress’s powers to raise armies and navies, authorize spending, and suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Honoring the Constitution to a ‘‘T’’ and
losing the war made no sense because losing the war would have destroyed
all of the Constitution, and permanently. Conditions had either redeﬁned
constitutional ﬁdelity or put it on the side of those who sought the Constitution’s violent destruction. Conditions had installed the imperative of prudential statesmanship for the Constitution’s sake over that of honoring the
Constitution’s terms.
Honoring the Constitution to lose the Constitution made no constitutional sense to Lincoln for another reason: he saw the Constitution as
means to ends bigger than itself. In his special message to Congress on
4 July 1861, Lincoln said something that the Reaganized gop has had a hard
time appreciating: that the struggle for the Union is ‘‘a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of government whose leading
object is to elevate the condition of men; to lift artiﬁcial weights from all
shoulders; to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all; to a√ord all an
unfettered start and a fair chance in the race of life. Yielding to partial and
temporary departures, from necessity, this is the leading object of the Government for whose existence we contend.’’∞Ω
Madison made the same kind of point in The Federalist 45 when he
accused the states’ righters of his day of forgetting that the ‘‘real welfare of
the great body of the people is the supreme object to be pursued; and that
no form of government whatever [!] has any other value, than as it may be
ﬁtted for the attainment of this value.’’≤≠ Madison said more of the same
when justifying the unconstitutional provisions for constitutional change
that the Philadelphia Convention had proposed in 1787. ‘‘Let [the Convention’s critics] declare,’’ wrote Madison, ‘‘whether it was of most importance
to the happiness of the people of America, that the articles of confederation
should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the
Union preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and
the articles of confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the pres236
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ervation of these articles was the end for securing which a reform of the
government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the end at
which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought,
as insu≈cient means, to have been sacriﬁced.’’≤∞
Formally, these statements by Lincoln and Madison are but instances of
a more abstract proposition: our basic law is an instrument of the good.
Our best statesmen disregard it when they have to, because the constitutional rules are means to ends that are attractive independently of the
means, and it’s irrational, as Madison said, to sacriﬁce ends to means. The
circumstances that Lincoln and Madison faced featured a conﬂict between
ends and means such that following the prescribed means would have defeated the very ends for which the means were ordained as law. Following
the basic law in these circumstances (either the Articles or the Constitution) would have been anti-constitutional if not unconstitutional. On these
occasions constitutions are silent; fully constitutional conduct is impossible. All one can hope for are pro-constitutional actions or, as we prefer,
constitutionalist actions≤≤ —actions that either (as in Lincoln’s case) restore
the conditions for honoring old means or (as in Madison’s case) replace
means that can’t be ﬁxed with better means to the same old constitutional
ends.≤≥ To save Bush from rank partisanship one must see the case in this
instrumentalist light; an unavoidable resort to unauthorized means to secure authorized ends.
We must add, however, that a constitutionalist justiﬁcation for Bush is
ludicrous if a situation approximating Lincoln’s is taken as a precondition
for such arguments. After the Court’s intervention in Bush, Adam Nagourney and David Barstow detailed in the New York Times what many commentators believed during the election controversy: the Republicans would do
what they had to do to win Florida—whatever they had to do.≤∂ That
included a resumption of the state legislature’s power to name the electors
should a count of the ballots have put Gore ahead. The Bush ﬁve made clear
in their ‘‘per curiam’’ opinion that they read the Constitution as permitting
a legislature to reclaim the electoral power at any time.≤∑ Two competing
sets of electors would have left the election to the conscience of the Republicans in Congress, and on any plausible scenario that guaranteed a victory by
Bush. The problem with this strategy was of course less legal than political:
the political risks included no less than the destruction of the Reaganized
237
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gop. A party fully prepared to reject the voters’ voice for the sake of partisan
success must be driven by more than mere partisanship—like an antidemocratic religiosity,≤∏ an anti-democratic racism,≤π an anti-democratic
social Darwinism,≤∫ or all three combined. The Republicans’ thirst for victory thus threatened to destroy the very image of reasonable conservatism
so skillfully and assiduously cultivated by their presidential candidate. No
one can say what the public’s reaction would have been, but action by
Republican legislators that would have removed all doubt about their
party’s extremism could have destroyed the gop nationally and endangered
its allies. These allies included not only the Rehnquist Court, which would
have been called upon to approve the actions of the Florida Republicans,
but also the Constitution, which can be interpreted to sanction what the
Florida Republicans seemed determined to do.≤Ω
It’s far from clear that the Bush ﬁve could have saved the Republicans
from themselves and the Constitution from the Republicans by any action
other than the one taken: stopping the count. This action did more than
insure Mr. Bush’s presidency, though the ﬁve doubtlessly saw that as a plus.
It also spared the nation a constitutional crisis that the Republicans seemed
determined to risk. A victim of that crisis might well have been the public’s
understanding of itself as part of an entity that can establish, structure, sta√,
orient, and limit a government by rules instrumental to its well-being. Because that understanding is inseparable from the Court’s own reputation as
a principled institution, as the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter observed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,≥≠ the Bush ﬁve hurt the
country to some extent by their unprincipled act. But the damage to Court
and country could have been much greater. The Court as an institution is
bigger than any ﬁve or any nine, and its legitimacy can survive their mistakes, to some extent. But the Court’s legitimacy is less able to survive clear
constitutional mistakes of any consequence, because the Court’s legitimacy is
predicated on the Constitution’s legitimacy. A constitution that would have
permitted a group of state legislators to overrule both the voters of Florida
and the nation’s electorate would doubtless have forfeited much of the
community’s esteem. And the public’s inability to correct that constitutional mistake (the right wing of the Republican Party is more than strong
enough nationally to block a constitutional amendment) would surely have
damaged the public’s own constitutionalist pretensions even more than the
decision in Bush.
238
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So here we are: Constitution betrayed, but betrayed ostensibly for its
own good and not in a way that most Americans couldn’t help noticing.
‘‘[T]he prejudices of the community [are still] on [the Constitution’s]
side,’’ a good thing, said Madison.≥∞ The Court did take what Professor Yoo
called an a√ordable ‘‘short-term hit to [its] legitimacy’’≥≤ among the cognoscenti, who had little regard for this Court anyway. But the nation is okay.
Happy or at least content with its formal constitution. And that has to
count for something. Doesn’t it? Who is willing to defend ﬁdelity to the
Constitution at the price of chaos? Al Gore wasn’t; he went away quietly
enough, as everyone expected him to, despite Bush’s charge during the
controversy that it was Gore who would do anything to win.
A colleague of one of us, Professor Gerard V. Bradley of the Notre
Dame Law School, shares our kind of theory of how to justify the actions of
the Bush ﬁve. He says that even if the ﬁve were wrong about the ‘‘bloodletting’’ to come after the count, they acted rightly in trying to stop it before it
began.≥≥ Why not credit them with ‘‘an act of political courage[?]’’ he
asks.≥∂ ‘‘[T]hey consciously redirected incoming ﬁre towards the one institution that everyone said could take the heat[.] The Court threw itself on
Florida’s grenade.’’≥∑ Heroism enough, to be sure, yet heroism made even
‘‘greater ’’ because a unanimous court was ‘‘unavailable’’ to the ﬁve.≥∏ Bradley
doesn’t mention Lincoln, but he might have cited him as another Republican who violated the Constitution to save it and the country. If Lincoln’s
actions were constitutionalist, though not strictly constitutional, can the same
be said for our heroic ﬁve?
Maybe, but not just yet. Consider one more complication. Lincoln violated the Constitution (1) trying to destroy its enemies and (2) in the service
of its ends.≥π For Lincoln, securing the conditions of constitutional government meant securing the conditions for the rule of the Constitution’s friends,
not for the rule of those willing to put the Constitution at risk. On our theory
of Bush, the ﬁve violated the Constitution to save it from harm, if not simply
to save it from destruction, as Lincoln did. But Lincoln defeated the grenade
throwers and the ﬁve didn’t even try. (Indeed, Scalia strained, both in his
concurring opinion concerning the stay≥∫ and in the subsequent oral argument,≥Ω to make sure that the grenades thrown by Bush’s lawyer Theodore
Olson did not miss their mark.) They avoided what Bradley calls ‘‘bleeding’’
and ‘‘institutional meltdown’’∂≠ by giving the grenade throwers what they
wouldn’t be denied. The party that threatened institutional meltdown won
239
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because it threatened institutional meltdown. It held the Constitution hostage to its ambitions for the country, and the ﬁve paid the ransom. By contrast, Lincoln’s actions were constitutionalist if not constitutional because he
sought to restore the conditions of constitutional government, conditions
favorable to rule by those who would be the last to throw grenades.
Lincoln’s actions were constitutionalist also because he acted in the service of constitutional ends, like union and equal opportunity. The Bush ﬁve
can claim to have acted for a constitutional end: domestic tranquility. Had
Bush been elected by Congress after Gore prevailed in the Florida recount
that would surely have jeopardized domestic tranquility, or so one could
reasonably have believed, rendering constitutional means inadequate to
constitutional ends, and justifying a constitutionalist act to secure a constitutional end. (Saﬁre could have had this in mind in arguing that the Court
‘‘did itself proud’’ and ‘‘saved the Republic’’ from ‘‘much tension’’ instead of
allowing the constitutionally prescribed procedures to take their course at
great harm to the country, with the end result that ‘‘we would have ended
up exactly where we are today: with President-elect Bush.’’)∂∞ One problem
for constitutional conservatives will be how to abandon a jurisprudence that
until now has emphasized institutional norms (like states’ rights, deference
to the political process, and judicial restraint, to say nothing of separation of
powers) and ‘‘negative liberties,’’ not substantive ends or goods. Bush made
sensible as a constitutionalist decision is wholly at odds with the negative
liberties model of the Constitution long favored by free marketeers and
formally adopted by the Rehnquist Court in DeShaney.∂≤ For a constitutionalist justiﬁcation presupposes a constitution that promotes substantive
goods in addition to protecting negative liberties. Constitutional conservatives will have problems justifying a jurisprudence that recognizes one or
two constitutional ends—adding domestic tranquility to their negative liberty, in lieu of the framers’ positive liberty and the Preamble’s promise of
liberty’s ‘‘blessings’’∂≥ —but not other positive goods, like a more perfect
union and the general welfare. If theoretical consistency were a force in
political events, defending Bush v. Gore would move the American right
wing away from the constitutionalism of Reagan and back to the constitutionalism of Lincoln.
Though we have few illusions about the political inﬂuence of intellectual
goods like theoretical consistency, we note (albeit with mixed feelings)
240
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the somewhat Lincolnesque opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.∂∂ In the week following the events of
September 11, 2001, Congress authorized the president ‘‘to use all necessary
and appropriate force’’ against nations, organizations, and persons that
planned or aided terrorist acts, as the president determines.∂∑ Pursuant to this
act, the United States declared two American citizens ‘‘enemy combatants’’
to be held and interrogated indeﬁnitely without formal charges, legal counsel, or visitors. One such ‘‘enemy combatant,’’ Yaser Esam Hamdi, was, in
the court’s words, ‘‘seized in Afghanistan during . . . active military hostilities’’ that followed the American invasion in early October 2001. Hamdi
was brought to the states, declared an ‘‘enemy combatant,’’ and held without
formal charges, counsel, or visitors in the Navy brig at Norfolk, Virginia.
In a≈rming the government’s power to hold Hamdi in isolation and
without formal charges, a unanimous three-judge panel led by Chief Judge
J. Harvey Wilkinson emphasized the practical di≈culties that courts face in
trying to second-guess the decisions of ﬁeld commanders on distant battleﬁelds. But Wilkinson and his colleagues were not saying that constitutional
rights must sometimes yield to the demands of war. They o√ered ‘‘a more
profound understanding of our rights’’ than that implicit in the conventional
dichotomy between individual rights and governmental powers. ‘‘For the
judicial branch to trespass upon the exercise of the warmaking powers,’’ they
said, ‘‘would be an infringement of the right to self-determination and selfgovernance at a time when the care of the common defense is most critical.
This right of the people is no less a right because it is possessed collectively.’’∂∏
Here the court recognizes a right of the people to act through their
government in pursuit of a good, national security, that helps them make
sense of the original act of establishing that government and vesting it with
warmaking powers. By deferring to those charged with using those powers,
the court presents itself as letting the Constitution speak, not silencing it.
Thus conceived, the Constitution is ﬁrst and foremost a charter of ends,
goods, or, if you will, beneﬁts. It is more than a charter of negative rights
against government. It is also a charter of at least one beneﬁt, national
security. And, we would ask, if the Constitution is a charter of the ends that
help make sense of some of its granted powers, why not also ends that help
make sense of the rest of its powers, ends like the people’s welfare and racial
justice?∂π
For originalists alarmed by such a prospect, we have cited good author241
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ity—Madison in The Federalist 40 and 45—to the e√ect that justice and the
people’s welfare, not things like states’ rights, are the real ends of government. To concerned civil libertarians, we would ask whether liberties
against government are not more secure if conceived not as dichotomous
with powers and associated ends, but as elements of them. How, for example, can anyone be sure either that national security is the chief motive of,
say, the Iraq War or that the Iraq War has enhanced the nation’s security—
how can the nation be sure of these things without extensive and robust
freedoms to know and criticize the government’s actions? How secure can
these freedoms be if government has the unreviewable right to detain citizens in isolation simply by declaring them enemy combatants? And of
liberals who fear that in present-day America a positive constitutionalism is
more likely than not to serve a combination of social Darwinist and imperialist ends, we would ask whether that result is less likely if the Fourth
Circuit, described recently as a ‘‘bold and muscular’’ intellectual citadel of
the American right—‘‘the shrewdest, most aggressively conservative federal
appeals court in the nation’’ and ‘‘the appellate court closest in thinking to
the Rehnquist Court’’∂∫ —is left to deﬁne the substantive constitution without challenge from the other side. (In this connection, we point to our
arguments elsewhere that an honest quest for the substantive constitution,
whether conceived in originalist terms or not, clearly favors the American
left over the American right.)∂Ω
Whether the opinion in Hamdi is a straw in the wind remains to be seen.
In the meantime, however, we see no movement from the negative constitutionalism of DeShaney in the writings of Chief Justice Rehnquist. In his
book All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime,∑≠ Rehnquist approves
Lincoln’s famous formulation: that if he had not suspended the writ of
habeas corpus during the Civil War, that would have meant allowing ‘‘all the
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces,
lest that one be violated.’’ More generally, Rehnquist practically embraces
the idea—inter arma silent leges—that during war the laws (and the Constitution) are silent.
In an essay in the New York Times, Adam Cohen ponders the implications
of Rehnquist’s book for the Bush administration’s restrictions on civil liberties in the current war on terrorism.∑∞ He bemoans that Rehnquist quotes,
with approval, not only Lincoln but also Francis Biddle, President Franklin
Roosevelt’s attorney general, who said: ‘‘The Constitution has not greatly
242

The Constitution in Wartime : Beyond Alarmism and Complacency, edited by Mark Tushnet, Duke University Press, 2005. ProQuest
Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bu/detail.action?docID=1168446.
Created from bu on 2022-06-21 15:37:17.

wa r , c ri s i s , a n d t h e c o n st i t u t i o n

Copyright © 2005. Duke University Press. All rights reserved.

5

bothered any wartime president.’’ Cohen continues, ‘‘[T]he most disturbing aspect of Rehnquist’s book is the lack of outrage, or even disappointment, he evinces when rights are sacriﬁced.’’
Rehnquist lacks outrage because although he gets the title of his book
from Lincoln, he does not get his jurisprudence or attitudes from Lincoln.
For Rehnquist, when constitutional forms, rights, and limits are suspended,
indeed the laws are silent and everything is permitted to the executive.
Rehnquist fails to see or to subscribe to Lincoln’s positive constitutionalism: he fails to see, as Lincoln saw, that when the Constitution is suspended,
the executive has restorative obligations, a≈rmative obligations to work
actively toward restoring conditions in which the Constitution can function
as law. These a≈rmative obligations include the pursuit of domestic policies
that would restore respect for constitutional forms, rights, and limits. As
argued above, Lincoln violated the Constitution to save the Union and the
Constitution, and he did so without paradox because ﬁdelity to the Constitution always presupposes material conditions that the Constitution cannot
guarantee. Again, honoring the Constitution to lose the Constitution made
no constitutional sense to Lincoln for another reason: with Madison, he
saw the Constitution as means to ends bigger than itself. His special message to Congress on 4 July 1861, quoted above, bears quoting again: the
struggle for the Union ‘‘is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form
and substance of government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men; to lift artiﬁcial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of
laudable pursuit for all; to a√ord all an unfettered start and a fair chance
in the race of life. Yielding to partial and temporary departures, from necessity, this is the leading object of the Government for whose existence we
contend.’’
In sum, war is epistemic. It revealed to Hobbes and Locke the nature of
man and the purpose of political life. It reveals to us the nature of the
Constitution and what it means to maintain it. War is conventionally seen as
testing the limits of constitutionalism, the point at which we compromise
or even abandon constitutional forms and rights. But war reminds us of the
Preamble’s promise of a good thing: the common defense. This good is
good because it anticipates the peaceful state where we enjoy other preambulary goods like domestic tranquility and the blessings of liberty, justly
distributed and justly secured. Instead of saying that victory in war com243
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petes with constitutional forms and rights, we might consider peace a prerequisite of honoring forms and enjoying rights.
Peace is a provision of power. It is adumbrated by authorizations or
‘‘powers’’ to declare war, raise armies and navies, and so forth. Power and its
positive provisions are thus prerequisite to following institutional norms
and honoring negative liberties. And the relationship holds for other institutional norms and negative liberties: no market or property, for example, without governmental provisions like a monetary system, laws deﬁning
and securing property, civil and criminal courts whose judgments are executed by force if need be, and, in the end, the active cultivation, typically
through public schools, of the skills and values on which a culture of property depends. The general point is made in the ﬁrst Federalist: no government, no liberty; they’re on the same side.∑≤ Lincoln repeats the message
three score and fourteen years later. See peace (a provision of power like the
power to wage war) as prerequisite to forms and liberties and you:

Copyright © 2005. Duke University Press. All rights reserved.

Restore the Constitution to coherence; Preserve the positive Constitution of the Preamble and the ratiﬁcation campaign; Carry forward to the
present the root idea of the Declaration of Independence and The Federalist 1 that constitution making, not ﬁdelity, is at the heart of the constitutionalist persuasion; Expose the positive side of the oath to preserve and
defend, for one can do neither without securing peace and what The
Federalist 45 calls the ‘‘welfare of the great body of the people.’’
War thus reveals the essentially positive nature of the Constitution and the
overriding positive duty of those who take the oath to preserve and defend it.
Lincoln is the exemplar of this view: His duty was to restore the conditions
for honoring constitutional forms and constitutional rights. Though he
sacriﬁced both to the war e√ort, they remained normative for him because
the war sought to restore the conditions for honoring them. Lincoln also
saw the need to perpetuate not just our institutions but the virtues on which
they depend—including the virtues of leadership and citizenship on those
occasions when ﬁdelity to institutions defeats the very purposes for which
they were instituted.
The Constitution’s greatest failing is the neglect of these virtues. Along
with no clear constitutional commitment to self-consciously educative institutions—like the public schools—we ﬁnd a constitutional reliance on private incentives in government and in civil society. This reliance leads either
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to demoting public purposes to derivatives of private ends or denying them
altogether. Bereft of public purposes that would engage a liberal publicspiritedness and sense of community, the ﬁeld is left to anti-liberals who
would compromise the secular public-reasonableness of a liberal order. The
true heirs of Lincoln must awaken to several facts and act accordingly: the
culture war is real, it demands personal risks, and the Constitution is on
their side.
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